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Abstract: Besides some interesting results, the Common 
Fisheries Policy has not delivered a sustainable use of fish 
resources. Recently, the Pew Environment Group released 
a study that finds that E. U. fisheries have failed to reduce 
fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on stocks at 
two/three time sustainable levels. Overcapacity and 
overcapitalisation of the sector was identified as the 
principal failure of the CFP. This conclusion may be well 
important in the CFP reform (2012) and put again the 
discussion about the tools that can be used to get 
sustainable management and better cohesion. The idea of 
creating markets for fishing rights as a means of 
internalising the externalities derived from the common 
property nature of fisheries have received considerable  
attention from the founding fathers of Law and Economics 
and Fisheries Economics such as Coase, Scott and Christy. 
Rights Based Management schemes have already been 
experimented in some specific fisheries and localizations. 
These experiences have a lot of teaching results about good 
practices of sustainable fisheries management and also 
about the limitations/risks of these tools. These conclusions 
are fundamental to explore the feasibility of these tools. 
The purpose of our study is to enter this debate and 
investigate the feasibility of introducing these new 
management regimes in the CFP.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the Pew Environment Group released a 
study that finds that E. U. fisheries have failed to reduce 
fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on stocks at 
two/three time sustainable levels. Overcapacity and 
overcapitalisation of the sector was identified as the 
principal failure of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  
This conclusion may be well important in the CFP 
reform (2012) and put again the discussion about the 
tools that can be used to get sustainable management 
and better cohesion. In a drafted “Green Paper” on the 
Reform, the European Commission is launching a wide, 
no-hold-barred consultation to the national 
administrations, stakeholders, researchers and other 
interested people. The objectives are to discuss the 
problems of this CFP and to explore the alternatives of 
change and the ways forward the new reform of fisheries 
policy.  
The principle of “Relative Stability” shapes the 
Common Fisheries Policy. Nowadays, the conservation 
and management regime of EU fisheries is based upon 
TACs and quotas. But, in recent years, much attention 
has focused on ITQs (Individual Transferable Quotas) 
and other Rights Based Management regimes as an 
approach that will encourage more efficient use in 
fisheries by the allocation of private property rights. One 
important issue in the debate of CFP reform is, 
precisely, the introduction of ITQs and other similar 
RBM schemes. 
Our paper is a contribution to this debate. The 
paper investigates the feasibility of introducing these 
new management regimes in the CFP. Our fundamental 
issues are - if, and how, can we deal with the problems 
of conflicting objectives in the fisheries policy and what 
will be the impacts of such a policy in terms of 
European cohesion. 
2. E.U. Fisheries: The Current Situation 
Since the early 80s, when “Blue Europe” was 
settled, almost three decades have passed and the 
Common Fisheries Policy is confronted with major 
challenges. Some elements of the CFP were reviewed in 
2002, and now, the Commission decided to seize the 
opportunity of passing another decade to undertake a 
new reform of this Policy. 
Two fundamental causes explain the current state of 
European fisheries: internal systemic weakness of the 
management and conservation regime and external 
challenges.  
CFP has not delivered sustainable exploitation of 
the resources. Conservation policy fails. Many stocks 
are outside safe biological limits. If current trends 
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subsist, many stocks will collapse. They’ve been 
exploited too heavily, particularly the demersal stocks. 
At the same time, fishing capacity went on growing. 
Illegal fishing and the lack of effective enforcement are 
also notable elements of this picture. 
This situation isn’t specific to the Community. In 
fact, worldwide concern about over- fishing and 
overcapacity in the fisheries sector is well documented. 
The economic fragility of the sector, reflected in poor 
profitability and declining employment, is the result of a 
special conjunction of over-investment, rising costs and 
diminishing resource stocks. 
At the political level, the difficulties, associated 
with the design and implementation of a regulatory 
system, are substantial:  
o Social constraints,  
o Diversity of socio-economic structural conditions of 
the fisheries sector in the member states,  
o Lack of involvement of the stakeholders in the 
management policy. 
External challenges are, also, present in the 
explanation of this situation. The enlargement of 
European Union and the globalisation of the economy, 
the emergence of new players in world fisheries 
(especially coastal developing countries) and the 
increased focus on the environment are, perhaps, the 
most visible.  
In the international scene, the CFP is confronted 
with a “creeping jurisdiction” process - the slowly slide 
to the coastal countries’ jurisdiction of many resources 
which were usually “common-property”. After the 
relative calm that succeeds the approval of the Law of 
the Sea (1982), conflicts and tension increased, in the 
90s.  
This picture is not entirely negative. CFP had 
positive results. It has managed the resources and 
contained conflicts at sea, provided some degree of 
stocks stability and avoided the total collapse of stocks 
in areas with higher pressure and assured the availability 
of supplies to the Europeans. However, according to the 
Commission, these results have been achieved at a high 
price in terms of the long-term viability of the sector and 
with inefficiencies in the allocation of resources that, 
perhaps, could have been more profitable if they were 
addicted to other sectors in the global European 
economy.  
The critical problem is that the fleet profitability is 
jeopardised by the under-utilisation of investments. The 
excess capacity and a more-or-less constant value of 
landings to be shared between a large number of actors, 
reduces the capacity of each vessel to earn an adequate 
income. In this context, the subsidy policy, artificially 
reducing the costs and risks of investment, in an already 
over-capitalised industry, promoted over-supply of 
capital. 
Recently, the Pew Environment Group 
commissioned a study (see the Report of Poseidon 
Aquatic Management Ltd, 2010) assessing the 
economic, environmental and social impacts of the 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, from 2000 
to 2006. The study finds that E. U. fisheries have failed 
to reduce fleet capacity thus exerting fishing pressure on 
stocks at two or three time sustainable levels. The 
members evaluated in this study accounted for more 
than 90% of the European fisheries subsidies (that 
amounted to 3,2 billion Euros). The key objective of the 
structural policy, that was to bring the fishing capacity 
of the European fleet into the line with the available 
biological resources, was not attended. Overcapacity 
and overcapitalization of the sector was identified as the 
principal failure of the CFP. The study also highlights 
that member-states failed to take environmental and 
social concerns into consideration when allocating 
public funding. This conclusion may be well important 
in the CFP reform and put again the discussion about the 
tools that can be used to get sustainable management 
and better cohesion. 
3. A “Comprehensive Fisheries Policy  
The Management and Conservation Regime of 
fisheries in the European Union is, to a high degree, the 
result of an historic process with multiple compromises 
among national devices and political interests. But, to 
look at the CFP as a simple, empirical result, of a day-
to-day experience, is an error. Understanding the current 
difficulties is not possible without paying attention to 
the philosophy of intervention underlined in the options 
of 1983, when “Blue Europe” was settled. 
The analysis of some basic documents and initial 
proposals of the Commission, in the 70s, allows 
identifying the philosophy and theoretical purposes that, 
implicitly or explicitly, were subjacent to the definition 
of the common fisheries management regime.  
Since the beginning, two basic alternatives for the 
formulation of the European fisheries policy were to be 
considered. At one extreme, a liberal policy that should 
only establish competition rules in a common market; at 
the other, a policy of effective intervention, 
administered at a superior level, which could manage the 
resources in a perspective of equilibrium between the 
dynamic, biological conditions of fish growth and the 
economic conditions of resource use. 
The Commission choice on the second was very 
clear: the necessity of a “comprehensive” fisheries 
policy was obvious. This choice rested upon the 
presupposition that free access (central to the Treaty of 
Rome) would lead to the overexploitation of the 
resources. This conviction was explicitly made: “The 
straightforward implementation of the principle of equal 
access is bound to result in the rapid exhaustion of 
resources; the consequences of such a situation would be 
unacceptable” (SEC (1975) 4503 final, p. 9). 
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Of course, that was a real problem for the 
Commission. Having the responsibility to assure the 
principles of the Treaty, it was out of discussion the 
opposition to the “equal access” principle. But, the fear 
of the “fishing race” and “overfishing” problems 
justified an intervention policy that could regulate the 
activity in the sector and obviate the perverse effects of 
open access. 
For such a policy to be feasible, it needed a central 
authority. That involved a supranational management of 
resources because, allowing free arbitration of the sector 
development by national states, could lead to 
discriminatory action and poor enforcement and control.  
In this context, we can also understand the purpose of 
the designed Common Structural Policy. This policy 
could help the poorest (and most dependent on fisheries) 
coastal areas in Europe by funding the modernization of 
the obsolete fleets of some member states. The so-called 
“fisheries fund” (Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance) was, in this sense, one of the fundamental 
elements of a real policy of structural reform but also of 
inclusion and cohesion in Europe, in what concerned the 
fisheries.  
Settled the philosophy of intervention, the 
discussion then turned to the management tools. The 
choice was on command and control instruments (direct, 
non-economic regulation instruments). The control of 
catches and selectivity in fisheries, with the 
establishment of TACs and quotas, and technical 
measures of conservation (closed seasons, closed areas, 
minimum dimensions of fish caught and so on) were the 
preferred forms of regulation. 
The motives of this option were based on several 
reasons that included an implicit evaluation of the 
advantages of this kind of controls vis-à-vis other 
regulation alternatives, namely, those usually designed 
as indirect-economic tools, like taxes or ITQs, whose 
principal objective is efficiency in resource use.  
At least, five fundamental reasons made the 
justification of that choice. 
First, the Commission recognised that a common 
policy had costs and generated a lot of administrative 
problems. The advantages of direct controls were clear. 
The design and control of these tools were simpler. The 
necessary biological information existed. The 
Community could count on the experience of 
organisations like CIEM, NEAFC or NAFO. On the 
other hand, the implementation of the regulation was a 
task that the Commission could not develop without the 
collaboration of the national administration services. 
The diversity of those, in terms of structure and 
efficiency, implied the existence of a simple and clear 
regulation, of unquestionable scientific hardness, as a 
pre-condition for an effective implementation. Of 
course, a policy based on economic tools should bring 
problems almost insurmountable: exigency in 
information, high transaction costs in the preparation 
and negotiation of regulation, doubtful capacity of 
execution of the administrative staffs in several member 
states. 
Second, the political constraint.  Despite its 
complexity, this issue can be put in a simple manner. 
Taxes and other economic tools, which are very exigent 
in political negotiations, were simply abandoned. For 
example, difficulties in tax harmonization in EU are well 
known. Taxation is a sensible question, seen as a 
domain of national sovereignty. All concessions in this 
field are problematic. Direct controls are less exigent 
and facilitate the compromises. 
Third, the problem of control and enforcement. The 
Commission has always given this question a central 
role in the Common Policy. Reasons are obvious. The 
Commission put the problem in ethics terms: “It’s the 
only way to assure that the sacrifices of some member 
states in the recovery of the stocks are not in vain 
because of the irresponsible action of others”. Once 
again, direct controls had advantages. Enforcement was 
easier with simple regulation that agents could 
understand, less costly in administrative terms, and, if 
there existed effective means of inspection, evasion was 
minimized.  
Fourth, the Commission’s preoccupation with 
uncertainty in stock evolution and environmental and 
economic changes, made the need for flexible tools. The 
possible necessity of urgent actuation in situations of 
environmental crisis, gave the direct-control tools a 
strong advantage, because they were easier to manage 
and modify.  
Finally, the Commission emphasised the objective 
of minimising the social costs of the fisheries policy. In 
an original proposal of September 76, the Commission 
explicitly expressed the preoccupation with social 
inclusion in the fisheries sector and with the European 
cohesion. In the opinion of the commissioners, the 
management regime should assure “an equitable 
distribution of the limited resources between the 
member-states”, and “maintain, as far as it is possible, 
the level of employment and income in the coastal zones 
and in the areas mostly dependent on fisheries”.  
The European Parliament made pressure in this 
way, too, stating that the biological basis on which 
conservation and management regime should rest upon, 
could not be more than a starting point and, at least in 
the short run, the guarantees of employment and social 
inclusion were irreplaceable objectives. It is true that 
direct controls could not avoid the sacrifices of 
fishermen, unemployment and social tension. However, 
the reaction to other management economic tools that 
result in the abandonment of the less efficient producers, 
could be worst.  
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 Facing these constraints, the answer was very clear: 
A system of TACs (total authorized capture) and quotas 
was a simpler solution for the problems of equitable 
distribution of fishing opportunities, depending only on 
the quotas distribution formula between member-states. 
This formula of definition and allocation of use rights in 
European fisheries is now dependent upon several 
factors, like the dependency on fisheries of some coastal 
areas, level of employment and redistribution of quotas 
by means of minimising the effects of Extended 
Fisheries Jurisdiction on distant water fisheries. This is 
the so-called Principle of Relative Stability that shapes 
the Common Fisheries Policy. It can be seen as a means 
of establishing a balance between the promotion of 
economic efficiency, in the long run, and the necessary 
social-economic equilibrium in the coastal areas, in the 
short run. 
4. The Reform of the CFP 
Besides the “balanced” fundaments of CFP, this 
economic and juridical construction did not obviate the 
results we highlighted in the first part of this paper. As 
we said, the choice of direct control tools, in the regime 
that was designed in 1983, means that those instruments 
were, implicitly, better evaluated. But there were costs. 
Direct controls do not eliminate “common property” 
externalities. These tools can help the recovery of stocks 
but they do not exclude competition and inter-temporal 
rationality is not imposed to the agents. So, inefficiency 
is maintained and overcapacity and overexploitation 
persists. 
What is interesting to analyse, now, is the 
following: Recognising the difficult situation of the 
fisheries sector and the management problem, the EU 
went on a great effort of reforming. Last Reform of 2002 
pretended to mark a new beginning for the CFP. The 
main changes implicated: 
o A long term approach in fisheries management,  
o A simpler policy of fleet capacity, putting on the 
Member states the responsibility of reduction of the 
fishing effort and of adapting it to the existing 
resources,  
o A better application and enforcement of common 
rules,  
o Stakeholders’ involvement. 
But some problems subsisted. In our opinion, in the 
core, they had to do with the persistence of conflicts 
between objectives. One of the most relevant is the 
problem of the contradiction between decreasing fishing 
effort and the need of maintenance of jobs and of some 
socio-economic balance in the coastal areas. The 
maintenance of decent standards of living for fishermen 
would demand increases or, at least, the same level of 
captures. Such seems to be contradictory with the urgent 
need of stock recovery. 
 
4.1 Quota Hopping and “The Pure Question of 
Democracy”  
 
The so called “Quota Hopping” problem is a very 
good example of our doubts and preoccupations.  
In the centre of the problematic we find (again) the 
Relative Stability principle. The fixed formula of quotas 
distribution between member-states reflects the fact that 
European fishermen representation is still linked to 
national and local communities. But this territorial logic 
is in perfect contradiction with the development 
conditions of a free market (as supported in the Treaty). 
In fact, free movement of capital and the “Free 
Establishment” principle rest under a different logic. 
“Quota-hopping”, usually understood as the 
flagging of fishing vessels in order to fish against the 
catch quotas of another country, is a by-product of CFP. 
By purchasing vessels and quotas in different countries, 
some fisheries enterprises act like perfect multinational 
firms capturing fishing stocks that were supposed to 
belong to national fishing communities.  
UK situation gives a “good” example. Although not 
restricted to this member state, it is the case of UK fleet 
that has attracted the most foreign investment, especially 
from Spain and Netherlands, and gave the phenomenon 
visibility for discussion. Something like 25% of British 
quotas were held, in the end of the nineties, by foreign-
owned quota-hopping vessels.  
This situation represents an important critic of the 
stakeholders to the CFP rules. They attacked the way the 
quota system is being circumvented by the so-called 
“flag” ships, which are vessels owned in one country but 
registered in another to allow access to its waters.  
“Quota-hopping” analysis may give important 
lessons for CFP reform. The first lesson has a special 
interest for several Social Sciences, from Sociology to 
Politics, from Economics to History. In fact, this is a 
good field to investigate the dichotomy between a 
national oriented policy and the process of de-
territorialisation arising from single market construction. 
We can observe how quota hopping emerges under the 
incompatibilities between the trans-nationalization 
process promoted through the “Europeanization” of EU 
policies and the territorial logic claimed by the national 
governments. 
In this context, an important issue is revealed that, 
perhaps, surmounts the CFP, itself. That's the pure 
question of democracy: how can economic powers, in 
the process of market development, pass over the 
political decisions made by the democratic, elected 
institutions? And, in a certain sense, surmount the 
objective of cohesion that was implicit in the 
supranational management? In such a policy, both 
government and non-governmental agents no longer 
have the monopoly over the political agenda. CFP is 
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defined through permanent interactions and 
negotiations. The non-territorial logic of EU governance 
challenges the social order inherited from European 
welfare states. These transnational actors, using EU 
rules, move permanently in the search of more favorable 
conditions and profits. This mobility of capital 
encourages more competition in the European fisheries 
sector, and, at the same time, raises more social 
uncertainty in the Member states.  
So, economic and social actors in the EU are no 
longer subject to one political authority that is able to 
guard the values of justice and equity. It seems that there 
are some actors who are playing “the rules of the game”, 
but, at the same time, surmounting the power of elected 
governments. The dynamics towards trans-
nationalisation encourages a diffusion of power and 
blurs the exercise of political democratic elected 
administration.  
4.2 Rights Based Management: The Debate 
Quota-hopping analysis highlights another 
important subject for the future of Common Fisheries 
Policy: the issue of Rights Based Management. 
All fisheries management systems in the world have 
introduced some form of use/access rights to face the 
problems derived from the “common property” nature of 
fisheries. The idea of creating markets for fishing rights 
as a means of internalizing the externalities derived from 
the common property nature of fisheries have received 
considerable  attention by the founding fathers of Law 
and Economics and Fisheries Economics such as Coase, 
Scott and Christy. The solution is to create a market of 
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) and confide in the 
self-regulation of such a system to conduct the fisheries 
to the economic efficiency and to promote inter-
temporal sustainable use of resources. 
There are several possibilities of doing this. In 
general, we first need to determine the TAC that 
guaranties the sustainable use of the fish stock and then 
we can divide this total amount in several unit quotas 
that are distributed between the fishing enterprises. A 
market for quotas can also be created. The objective is 
that, after some time, the property rights will be driven 
to the most efficient agents, those that can allocate the 
resources in a perspective of optimal sustainable use 
along the time. Because they are the “real owners” they 
will internalize the effects of externalities. 
Rights Based Management schemes have already 
been experimented in some specific fisheries and 
localizations. These experiences have a lot of teaching 
results about good practices of sustainable fisheries 
management and also about the limitations/ risks of 
these tools. These conclusions are fundamental to 
explore the feasibility of these tools as instruments of 
conservation in the CFP. 
This kind of economic methods has a special 
advantage in the sense that they introduce mechanisms 
that should conduct the fisheries to the efficiency, 
eliminating the less efficient producers and changing, 
effectively, the agents’ behavior.  
ITQs are usually considered the best regulation 
choice on efficiency grounds. Granting the fisherman an 
individual quota may reduce the incentives to race for 
fish. We can expect: 
o Benefits at the capacity level and fishing effort 
rationalization,  
o Reduced fleet size and optimal vessel configuration,  
o Flexible and extended fishing seasons,  
o Higher catch-per-unit of effort.  
This may, also, enhance the quality of landings and 
improve markets and safety operations by avoiding the 
landings glut, by reducing storage costs and so on.  
But there are also a lot of problems. Professor Copes, in 
the mid 80s, when the first experiences with ITQs were 
evaluated, referred the problems of property 
concentration and, of course, the consequent problem of 
unemployment.  
After a period of change of quotas in the market, the 
problem of monopolization of the sector is well 
documented in several fishing-cases analysis. The 
number of owners tends to decline in time and there may 
be widening income disparities.  
The unemployment is a huge difficulty of this 
method. The abandonment of the less efficient producers 
creates a lot of difficulties in some coastal areas where 
the mostly dependent on fisheries populations live. 
Given the poor capacity of inter-professional mobility of 
many fishermen, the introduction of these methods 
accelerates the social crisis in those depressed maritime 
worlds and put in danger some important cultures and 
ways of living.  
We can also introduce other important issues. One 
relates with the mechanism design of this kind of 
methods. For example: How can we make the initial 
division and distribution of quotas? A “Grandfathering” 
system? Auctions? Should the initial distribution take 
account of “historic catches” from the companies? And 
what about those companies that, in a certain moment, 
did not enter a certain fisheries, but has now a real 
interest in the business? For those who were in the initial 
distribution, the quotas seem like a “windfall gain”.  
Owners of initial quota will sell at a price 
representing the full present value of the stream of rents 
generated, that is, the ones wishing to enter will have to 
pay, in advance, the full value of resource rents – it’s 
what we call a “transitional gains trap”. 
According to Ronald Coase, this is not a problem, 
because what is important is the final result. Something 
like the “Invisible Hand” will drive the system to the 
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best equilibrium solution. But, in the short time? What 
are the social and political reactions to these 
uncomfortable situations? 
Also, the problems of monitoring. Usually, 
economists highlight these methods because they 
introduce some kind of self-regulation. In fact, the sense 
of ownership should give the property-rights users, the 
real perception that the results of their actions will affect 
the net economic benefits that results from resource 
utilization. So, they should manage the resources in a 
sustainable way. But, the reality shows that, without a 
government control policy, a lot of problems subsist, 
including data fouling and quota busting, discarding, 
more intensive utilization of best fishing grounds, etc. 
And, of course, the problem of rents distribution - 
the issue of equity vs. efficiency always marking the 
debate in Economics. The economic theory proves the 
equivalence, in terms of efficiency, between the 
pigouvian tax and a scheme of ITQs, but the distribution 
gains between agents is still different. In the first case 
(pigouvian tax), the rents are optimized by the 
regulation Agency and, in the second (ITQs), rents and 
welfare gains are distributed between the private agents.  
Besides the theoretical discussion on efficiency grounds, 
still persists the practical, fundamental question. Rights 
based management can improve the efficiency in 
fisheries management. But, who will ultimately receive 
the gains of sustainable use of resources. How will the 
rents be distributed? Who are the winners, who are the 
losers? “The winner takes it all?” 
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
What can we conclude about the possible 
generalization of these Rights Based Management 
schemes in the CFP? The principle of Relative Stability, 
which guides the allocation of fishing possibilities to the 
EU members, is, as we saw, an exemption from the 
internal market that is embedded in the CFP. However, 
the quota hopping is a signal that the agents 
circumvented this principle of territorial definition of 
rights. Perhaps, by setting up a transparent system for 
transfers of fishing rights, member states could more 
easily regulate and monitor such trade in use rights. 
Since quota-hopping can be taken as the evidence 
of a desire to trade fish quotas at the EU level, we might 
think that a lot of inefficiencies are resulting from the 
actual regime of management and expect that in a new 
free regime of trade a clearly reduction in transaction 
costs would result. Of course, that would result in more 
economic efficiency. But, the issue of introducing a 
more liberal property rights trade system will have to 
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